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Policy implications
\ Enabling political participation  
requires that the participants them-
selves set the format and agenda for 
negotiations
Peace process agendas should not be externally  
determined but rather allow peace process participants 
to decide—or in the case of external mediation  
co-determine the content, as well as the format of 
talks according to their own priorities regarding 
themes, organisational set-up and the timing deemed 
necessary to conclude agreements. 
\ Prioritising participation helps  
avoid common omissions in peace 
agreements 
By taking the potentials of political participation  
seriously and establishing the relevant mechanisms  
to accompany mediation, peace process organisers  
automatically ensure the integration of crucial peace-
building dimensions in peace agreements and related 
implementation. 
\ Prioritising representativeness over 
mere inclusion in peace negotiations 
and rendering selection criteria trans-
parent strengthens their legitimacy
Policymakers should make their criteria transparent for 
selecting a) who can participate in the broad spectrum 
of peace processes and b) who gets access to the  
negotiation table by participating in an official delegation. 
These choices should prioritise representativeness over 
mere inclusion to strengthen process legitimacy. 
\ Peace process organisers should 
take the whole spectrum of societal 
interests into account
There is an added value to broadening the participa-
tion base of peace process participants beyond bellig-
erent groups and institutionalised civil society actors. It 
should include those of the non-fighting groups inside 
and outside the country of conflict, those of marginal-
ised groups who do not have institutionalised rep-
resentation structures, including displaced persons and 
the victims of the conflict. 
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Background
In this Policy Brief, we present lessons learnt and sub-
sequent policy implications from an in-depth analysis 
of the UN peace processes on Afghanistan and Syria. 
We argue that in both processes, the ability of peace 
process participants who come from Afghanistan and 
Syria to politically participate in their respective pro-
cess was and is severely limited, thus hindering the 
prospects of successful conflict transformation. By 
political participation, we mean that peace process 
participants not only attend negotiations (“are being 
included”) but are in a position to (co-) determine 
who is negotiating the agreement (incl. which repre- 
sentation mechanism is adequate), what is the format 
of peace-making (incl. methods of consultation), and 
what are the issues negotiated in which order (agenda- 
setting). We call this ‘meaningful political participation’. 
Emphasising “inclusivity” in peace processes over 
meaningful political participation is highly problem-
atic for potential progress towards longer-term/ 
sustainable peace. Potential organisers of peace 
negotiations and related pre- and post-peace agreement 
measures (whether outside actors or ‘indigenous’) 
should strengthen political participation and process 
legitimacy for representatives from the populations 
concerned. This would contribute to opening a new 
pathway towards more sustainable peace processes, 
also beyond the Syrian and Afghan cases. 
The Afghan and Syrian peace processes 
The findings of this Policy Brief pertain to UN-convened 
peace processes for Afghanistan between 1980 and 
2004 and for Syria since 2012. Both peace processes 
have a track record of not having achieved conflict 
transformation  towards peace over forty and ten 
years respectively. Although frequently, peace pro-
cesses are seen as too context- specific to compare, 
our research shows crucial similarities between the 
logics underpinning these processes. 
Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, UN conflict resolution efforts have 
been recorded since January 1980, after the interven-
tion of the Soviet Union in the last days of 1979 to aid 
the Marxist regime that had toppled the republican 
government in a coup d’état in April 1978. The subse-
quent proxy conflict during the Cold War was condi-
tioned by a blocked UN Security Council and the  
extension of the Secretary General’s good offices and 
a representative who engaged in shuttle diplomacy 
and proximity talks that led to the Geneva Accords by 
1988. These agreements between Afghanistan and  
Pakistan excluded the armed resistance and regulated 
only the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. 
It did not include any provisions to address post- 
withdrawal power-sharing. 
After UN-mediation failed to reach a power-sharing 
deal by 1992, a civil war evolved among armed opposi-
tion groups. All following efforts at peace-making did 
not reach the level of direct talks. 
After 9/11, US military action and a victor’s siege of 
Kabul preceded the UN Talks on Afghanistan at the 
end of November 2001 in Königswinter near Bonn 
(Petersberg). Here, a power-sharing agreement was 
reached that excluded the Taliban and other armed 
opposition groups but also representatives of pro- 
democracy and human rights groups. The transition 
was explicitly meant to be Afghan-led per what the 
United Nations designated as a light- footprint ap-
proach, including leaving it to the Afghans to make 
provisions for the inclusion of groups who were not 
present in the UN Talks in the process that followed. 
Syria
In Syria, peaceful protest against four decades of  
dictatorship under the regime of Bashar al-Asad that 
began in spring 2011 was not met by reforms but 
rather repression and war. After initial mediation by 
the Arab League, the United Nations took on the pro-
cess by providing good offices since February 2012,  
initially strongly relying on shuttle diplomacy with 
external states.
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Three years into the war, the United Nations began 
summoning intra-Syrian proximity talks of regime 
and opposition delegations in Geneva (including back-
ground shuttle diplomacy), bar one round of direct 
talks. While the regime delegation remained largely 
unchanged, the formation of opposition delegations 
had been accompanied by significant changes. These 
had been drawn from several newly created umbrella 
organisations that were internationally declared as 
‘the official Syrian opposition’, i.e. the Syrian National 
Council (SNC, Istanbul, Turkey, October 2011), the Syrian 
National Coalition (SNC, Doha, Qatar, November 2012), 
the Higher Negotiation Committee (HNC, Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia, December 2015) and the Syrian Negoti-
ating Committee (new SNC). Presently, the new SNC 
encompasses over 134 members from 56 armed and 
civic sub-groups, many of which represent umbrella 
groups themselves. The creation of these bodies has 
excluded other significant opposition groups (such as 
the National Coordination Bureau, NBC). At the same 
time, it has sidelined earlier and alternative peace 
processes organised by Syrians. 
High-level diplomatic meetings have been comple-
mented by several civil society fora as part of the  
process. The Geneva process has also encompassed a 
wide range of summits of external states (for instance, 
the Friends of Syria Group, the International Syria  
Support Group). These have often excluded Syrian 
participants but at the same time produced several 
peace plans and documents regarded as key documents 
for the process by the United Nations and in media 
reporting. 
In both processes, military developments on the 
ground are a major reason why these peace processes 
have not yet been accompanied by longer-term con-
flict resolution. Yet, we have identified four additional 
obstacles within the setup of these UN processes that 
impede meaningful political participation from 
among actors from the country at war, thus under-
mining process legitimacy. Conversely, we suggest that 
adopting these lessons learnt would strengthen the 
prospects for conflict resolution in the longer term. 
Prioritising representativeness over 
mere inclusion in peace negotiations 
and rendering selection criteria trans-
parent strengthens legitimacy 
Peace process organisers (e.g. UNDPA, swisspeace) 
should make transparent how they value inclusivity, 
what they mean by it and how they intend to achieve 
it. To enhance the legitimacy of peace processes, clear 
criteria on who is included how and why, in which 
tracks of a given peace process need to be established, 
and these must aim for representativeness to the 
greatest extent possible. The lack of transparency has 
remained problematic even after the United Nations 
officially endorsed the principle of “inclusivity” in 
2012. It stressed this norm could not create represent-
ativeness in peace processes because these must work 
through major conflict parties, but it would ensure 
that their “views and needs” are represented in the 
process. Yet, there are no transparent criteria for the 
United Nations as a peace process convenor, for in-
stance, to decide who is included in or excluded from 
negotiations. Instead, criteria to which standards are 
used and when inclusivity is thought to be sufficient-
ly achieved are unclear. Efforts to create a shared 
meaning of inclusivity are commonly absent.
In the case of Syria and Afghanistan, UN-mediated 
peace processes lacked transparency on at least two 
levels. First, the decision of who from among (civic) 
political and armed non-state actors from the coun-
try at war holds a seat at the negotiation table. While 
our research confirms that conflict parties seek to in-
fluence and often limit such access, it also shows that 
gaining access to this level of negotiations is a highly 
selective process governed primarily by the interests 
of external states who seek to secure influence over 
who may later attain ministerial or economic posi-
tions. Participants often gain access only if, and for as 
long as, they can harness the interest and support of 
a given external foreign ministry of other states, or if 
they possess relevant personal contacts.  
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was excluded from participation at the last minute. 
Moreover, refugee and IDP communities are seldom 
represented in the Afghan and Syrian peace processes, 
even though 50 per cent of the Syrian population and 
well above 50 per cent of the Afghan population have 
been forcibly displaced by war and violent conflict 
over the years. 
The option of involving exile groups’ peace initiatives 
needs to be systematically built into the organisational 
peace process, which is presently not the case. Our  
research reveals a general lack of attention to bottom- 
up transformation efforts towards peace brought 
about by initiatives such as civic education for peace 
(cf. BICC Policy Brief 2/2021), even though such self- 
initiated peace processes build onto organically grown 
networks from within and outside of the country at 
war. These can minimise, and sometimes actively 
seek to prevent, extensive foreign influence. 
In the case of Afghanistan, several civic initiatives  
established by Afghans in exile throughout the 1980s 
have attempted to forge alliances and networks to 
end violence, seek a negotiated solution to foreign  
occupation and create a transitional government 
from 1987 onwards. For example, bureaucrats and  
royalists representing the pre-1974 constitutional 
monarchy were connected across Europe and the 
United States, forming various associations for peace 
and unity which authored several peace proposals, 
lobbied and mobilised for support not only among  
Afghans but also foreign governments. It was a missed 
chance that until 1987 the UN did not acknowledge 
these actors as valid participants in the peace process. 
During the civil war that followed in the 1990s and 
Taliban rule until late 2001, different types of well- 
connected and private Afghan citizens attempted to 
bring the main armed adversaries to the negotiating 
table. For Syria, a Damascene trading family brought 
together a wide range of oppositional actors including 
leading political personalities, activists, academics, 
human rights lawyers and businesspersons largely 
from within Syria as one of several beginnings of a 
Syrian-led peace process in Antalya in May/June 2012. 
Second, these unwritten, but practised “rules” of  
admission also often apply to civil society actors’  
engagement in the process. Rather than foreign min-
istries, on this level, (I)NGOs push for the inclusion  
of “their” candidates at the expense of others. These 
filtering mechanisms demonstrate that participants 
are indeed pre-selected. Future research will have to 
address how this could be amended to achieve greater 
representativeness as a prevalent norm to consolidate 
peace process legitimacy. The key implication for policy 
is that as much as possible, peace process organisers 
should make their criteria for inclusivity and their 
selection of who has access to the negotiation table 
transparent. These choices should prioritise representa-
tiveness over mere inclusion to strengthen process 
legitimacy.
Representativeness goes beyond the 
participation of belligerent groups and 
institutionalised civil society actors
Peace process organisers should take the whole  
spectrum of societal interests into account to include 
the interests of
   \ non-fighting groups inside and outside the 
country of conflict;
   \ (often minority) groups who do not have 
institutionalised representation structures; 
   \ refugees and IDPs;
   \ victims of the conflict
and establish participatory mechanisms for all these 
actors to ensure that their needs and interests are  
reflected and taken account of in peace agreements 
as well as subsequent implementation measures.
One of our findings is that political and armed groups 
with broad-based and long-term popular support are 
often missing among the participants who act as  
negotiators in peace processes. In Afghanistan, the 
decision of who appeared at the negotiation table was 
organiser-driven. The UN-Talks on Afghanistan 2001 
neither included the antagonists of war (representa-
tives of the hastily overthrown Taliban government, 
Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami), nor the pro-democratic 
forces that were subsumed in a fifth delegation that 
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an (Emergency) Loya Jirga in June 2002 to determine 
the transitional authority, the constitution-writing 
process within 18 months, which was to result in an-
other (Constitutional) Loya Jirga in 2003, and the end 
of the Bonn process with free and fair elections after 
three years (in 2004). Besides the sheer speed of envis-
aged state-building, the UN Talks participants were 
neither selected based on criteria of representativeness 
(see above) nor was their selection transparent.  
During the UN Talks, external powers influenced the 
determination of a chairman and the appointment of 
cabinet positions for the interim administration to 
the point that individual participants were pressured 
(for instance to agree on a US- and UN favoured chair-
man) by international observers, especially US- and 
UN-representatives. Among other things, immense 
external pressure on all conference participants to 
agree on the interim authority, approve a peacekeep-
ing force yet to exclude provisions on transitional 
justice has harmed the Bonn process. Interviews 
with participants in the UN Talks confirm that they 
perceived these overriding pressures as disabling in 
terms of self-determined political participation. 
In the case of Syria, the Special Envoys used different 
approaches in their agenda-setting—yet equally, leaving 
no or only little leeway for process participants to de-
termine it. For example, during Geneva II in February 
2014, Lakhdar Brahimi as the Special Envoy at the 
time had asked the regime and opposition delegation 
to agree on the priorities of the agenda. The regime 
delegation insisted on focusing on combatting terror-
ism, while the opposition sought to discuss the transi-
tional governing body. As a compromise, Brahimi sug-
gested focusing one day on each. The regime refused, 
leading Brahimi to halt the talks. During a later round 
of negotiations in March 2016, the opposition delega-
tion had drafted papers on the political transition  
process they proposed to discuss, whereas the regime 
prioritised the principles governing the negotiations. 
Without any further explanation, Special Envoy de 
Mistura announced his decision to discuss the princi-
ples. This decision forced the opposition delegation to 
accept it or leave. Having to make this ‘choice’ 
Attempts such as these, however, became quickly su-
perseded by UN engagement from June 2012 onwards. 
Since individuals have limited time and resources to 
engage in peace processes—attendance of which is 
usually not paid for by the United Nations—those 
wishing to be active became divided between different 
formats. This has weakened bottom-up attempts to 
negotiate for peace that have been based on internal 
networks. From this, we can deduce that peace process 
organisers should recognise and, where possible, sup-
port, but not appropriate peace processes organised 
by persons or groups from the country at war itself. 
Enabling political participation means 
that the participants themselves set 
the format and agenda for negotiations 
Prioritising political participation means that peace 
process participants are enabled to set the agenda of 
what is being negotiated, in which format, and for 
how long. Having mediators mainly determine the 
agenda interferes with the prioritisation of negotiation 
needs by participants from the conflict setting. It is 
striking that internationally mediated peace processes 
prioritise questions of state institutions and structural 
economic reforms over issues like transitional justice, 
livelihoods and economic self-sufficiency. Moreover, 
international political and aid organisations expect 
war-torn countries and peace process participants to 
implement measures like security sector and eco-
nomic reforms, constitution-writing and the holding 
of elections within a very short period of time. These 
measures serve the interests of international road-
maps and election term cycles in Northern capitals 
and impose unrealistic deadlines. Such pressure  
allows no time for conflict parties to define their own 
interests and positions, which is necessary for the 
peacebuilding process after an agreement is signed. 
The UN Talks on Afghanistan in 2001 and the subse-
quent transition phase (so-called Bonn-process)  
followed a roadmap drawn up by the United Nations. 
It included milestones such as the immediate crea-
tion of a six-month interim authority, the holding of 
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In the case of Syria, no comparable agreements have 
been reached yet, but similarly, the trajectory of the 
ongoing process regarding concerns of those dis-
placed (e.g. land and housing rights) or necessary  
security sector reform has not been promising.  
Other peace processes (e.g., in Burundi from 2000 on-
wards and Guatemala in the second half of the 1990s) 
have highlighted how the inclusion of refugees and 
IDPs in peace processes can ensure that mechanisms 
for the recovery of land and property receive due atten-
tion. This attention is expressed in the form of resettle-
ment commissions or comprehensive reforms of land 
tenure institutions and in that refugees are enabled 
to participate in post-conflict elections, for example. 
The inclusion of these topics serves especially the  
interest of those groups that are vulnerable to being 
excluded from peace processes due to their structural 
weakness in many conflict societies, such as women, 
representatives of ethnoreligious minorities, youth, 
victims of violence and displaced people. Beyond  
this, these issues must also be addressed in post- 
agreement peacebuilding in general to create legiti-
macy and achieve sustainable peace. Lastly, cases like 
Colombia highlight the peacebuilding-potential of 
including educational provisions in the peace agree-
ment, a decision that is certainly in the interest of 
youth but also benefits women, returnees and 
ex-combatants if not the entire population. Prioritis-
ing political participation thus not only ensures the 
integration of crucial peacebuilding dimensions in 
peace agreements and related implementation plans, 
but also furthers long-term bottom-up conflict 
transformation.
damaged the delegations’ reputation. By 2018, the 
Higher Negotiation Committee’s say in the agenda 
had been diminished further. As pointed out by one 
interviewee: “When we have an upcoming round in 
Geneva, the UN office only gives us the agenda with 
items to be discussed on the evening before the actual 
talks. One evening! We asked to receive it earlier. It 
would take time for us to prepare well and to discuss 
how we want to position ourselves. They don’t give it 
us earlier.    …    What can we do?   …   Nothing.”  
Similarly to the UN-mediated processes for Afghanistan, 
in the UN Geneva process for Syria, all documents the 
UN and international media outlets considered key  
documents and peace plans did not include any plans 
brought forward by Syrian initiatives or from among 
peace process participants themselves. It is against this 
background that we argue that peace process agendas 
should not be externally determined but rather be de-
cided by peace process participants according to their 
own priorities regarding themes, organisational set-up 
and timing. 
Prioritising participation helps avoid 
common omissions in peace agreements
Representative mechanisms for inclusion and 
self-determination of the format and agenda of peace 
negotiations and subsequent implementation by pro-
cess participants (who represent all relevant groups 
of society) will help avoid pitfalls in achieving long- 
lasting peace. This logic also pertains to the inclusion 
of issues in peace agreements that are usually disre-
garded, such as transitional justice or property resti-
tution. In UN-mediated agreements (1988 and 2001) 
in Afghanistan, for instance, detailed provisions for 
physical safety—which is important for stayees, dis-
placed and returnees, and the latter’s reintegration 
perspectives—were left out. So were provisions to 
hold perpetrators of war crimes criminally respon- 
sible, as were provisions to establish institutional 
mechanisms for confronting the past. 
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